G. R. Selvaraj (Dead), through LRs. v.
K. J. Prakash Kumar
D.O.D : 25/11/2025
Appeal Allowed
Civil P.C. (5 of 1908) , O.21 R.64, O.21 R.66, O.21 R.90(3)— (as Amended By Act 104 Of 1976) - Execution of decree - Auction sale - Belated objection - On objection raised by judgment debtor, sale was set aside by High Court on the ground that executing Court had not examined whether sale of a part of the property would have satisfied the decree - After amendment of 1976, O.21 R.90(3) of CPC prohibits any ground being raised for setting aside sale if such ground could have been taken before the date of drawing up sale proclamation - Judgment debtors were put on notice at every stage, participated to an extent and then refrained from doing so - Since judgment debtors failed to raise objection at the appropriate stage despite due notice, they would be barred from doing so belatedly - Setting aside of sale by the High Court assuming that obligation under O.21, R.66(2)(a) of CPC would operate independently upon the executing Court, irrespective of lapse on the part of judgment debtors, was erroneous.
Hon'ble Judge(s):
B. V. Nagarathna,
R. Mahadevan
, JJ
Inder Chand Bagri v.
Jagadish Prasad Bagri
D.O.D : 24/11/2025
Appeal Allowed
Criminal P.C. (2 of 1974) , S.482— Quashing of proceedings - Prima facie case - Offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust in furtherance of criminal conspiracy - Complaint against accused related to sale of alleged partnership property by accused - Offence of cheating was not made out in the absence of material to attribute any fraudulent or dishonest intention to accused at time of creation of partnership agreement - Merely alleging that accused dishonestly induced complainant to part with property of partnership firm and subsequently sold it to a third party would not satisfy the test of dishonest inducement to deliver a property or part with a valuable security - Offence of criminal breach of trust was also not made out in the absence of material to show entrustment of property to accused, especially since partnership and supplementary deeds clearly indicated that property was solely owned by accused - Offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust are antithetical to each other and cannot coexist simultaneously in same set of facts - Allegations had been made against accused with mala fide intent - Complainant was already pursuing remedy of civil suit - Continuing criminal proceedings would cause undue harassment - Complaint and all consequent proceedings were quashed
Hon'ble Judge(s):
B. V. Nagarathna,
R. Mahadevan
, JJ
Samadhan Sitatram Manmothe v.
State of Maharasthra
D.O.D : 24/11/2025
Appeal Allowed
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (46 of 2023) , S.528— Quashing of proceedings - Offence of rape - Consensual relationship - Allegation that accused, a practising advocate, established physical relations with complainant on pretext of marriage - Accused allegedly met complainant for the first time in reference to a case which was instituted by her against her husband - The relationship had continued for a long period of 3 yrs - FIR showed that complainant met accused whenever he expressed a desire to meet her - Complainant who was a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated with accused and entered into physical intimacy on her own volition - Physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instance of offence of rape merely because relationship failed to culminate in marriage - At the relevant time, marriage of complainant was subsisting - Continuation of criminal proceedings would be abuse of process of court - FIR and chargesheet were quashed.
(A) Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (2 of 1965) , S.18, S.12(1)— Eviction - Appeal against order for - Fresh application u/S. 12(1) - Whether mandatory - In an Appeal challenging eviction order u/S. 12(3) of the Act of 1965, a fresh application u/S. 12(1) of the Act, 1965 is not mandatory - In cases where supervening events have taken place during the pendency of Appeal, parties would have the liberty to file an application u/S. 12 of the Act, 1965 once again before the Appellate Authority
AIROnline 2025 KER 629-ReversedAIR 2005 SC 1090-Explained
In the instant case, in proceedings initiated on an application u/S. 12(1) before the Rent Controller, tenant was directed to deposit arrears of rent . On failure of tenant to do so, in exercise of powers u/S. 12(3), Rent Controller directed the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the property. In appeal filed by tenant , Appellate Court directed him to deposit admitted rent . On failure of tenant to deposit same, appeal proceedings were stopped. High Court held that a fresh S. 12(1) application ought to have been filed in the appeal.
Held, in an Appeal challenging eviction order u/S. 12(3) of the Act of 1965, a fresh application u/S. 12(1) of the Act, 1965 is not mandatory.
S. 12(1) specifically stipulates that no tenant shall be entitled to contest either an eviction petition before the Rent Control Court or an Appeal before the Rent Control Appellate Authority unless he has paid or deposited with the Court, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due and continues to pay the rent which may subsequently become due. In the event of non-deposit/non-payment of rent without any sufficient cause, S. 12(3) empowers the Courts to stop all proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Since the power to evict under S. 12(3) is by operation of law, not even an application for eviction is required to be filed by the landlord. Rent Control Appellate Authority is not the Court of first instance, it only tests the exercise of jurisdiction and power by the Rent Control Court. The Appellate Authority is not required to re-determine the issue of default or the outstanding amount of rent.
Ss. 12(1) and 12(3) procedure is to be primarily followed by the Rent Controller. It is essentially in cases where supervening events have taken place during the pendency of Appeal, that the parties have the liberty to file an application under S. 12 of the Act, 1965 once again before the Appellate Authority like where rent has been paid till the date of filing of the Appeal, but by the time the Appeal has matured for hearing, further rent has accrued, which has not been paid.
To say that filing of fresh application u/S.12(1) in appeal is mandatory, would delay the eviction of an 'intransigent and recalcitrant tenant'.
Court further pointed out that , as the Rent Control Appellate Authority has full power to examine the legality and validity of the eviction order passed by the Rent Controller under S. 12(3) of the Act, 1965, to insist upon the Appellant-landlord to repeat the procedure under S. 12 of the Act, 1965 would be a superfluous and unnecessary exercise.
(B) Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (2 of 1965) , S.12(3), S.11— Eviction - Non-payment of rent - Grant of time to pay rent - Plea of tenant that Appellate Authority erred in granting only four days instead of four weeks' time to deposit arrears - Act does not provide that even the Appellate Authority must give four weeks' time to the tenant to pay outstanding rent determined by Rent Controller - Further, as the Appellate Authority does not have to pass an order u/S. 12(3) once again, it is not obliged to give four weeks' time to deposit the outstanding rent - Tenant was occupying two premier shops in prime location of the city, for the last more than five years without paying any rent, despite a money decree passed against him - Plea was not tenable
Bharat Kantilal Dalal (Dead) By Lrs v.
Chetan Surendra Dalal
D.O.D : 20/11/2025
Order Accordingly
(A) Letters Patent (Bombay) , Cl.15— Arbitration and Conciliation Act (26 of 1996) , S.36— Letters Patent appeals - Maintainability - On application for execution of arbitral award, filed by appellant , seeking issuance of notice under O.21, R. 22 of CPC , Single Judge of High Court held that execution must proceed and a notice under O.21, R. 22 of CPC should issue - Respondent uncle of appellant filed a chamber summons raising objections, to the execution of the arbitral award and assailing the same as being a nullity - Single Judge held that arbitral award had attained finality and could neither be set aside under the Act nor could be declared as nullity - Letters patent appeals were filed challenging both the orders - Orders had been passed by single judge in course of execution of arbitral award and therefore, were traceable to Act of 1996 and not to CPC - Respondent was arrayed in execution proceedings as legal representative/executor of the Will of appellant's father and not in his individual capacity - Respondent would step into shoes of judgment debtor for limited purpose of execution - The Letters Patent Appeals were not maintainable - Division Bench had erred in admitting appeals without assigning any reasons - Execution proceedings were restored.
Letters Patent Appeal No(s). 320 and 372 of 2015, D/-06-03-2018 (BOM)-Reversed(Paras1922)
(B) Civil P.C. (5 of 1908) , O.21 R.22, O.21 R.23— Execution proceedings - Notice to show case - Nature of provision for - Explained
Order 21 Rule 22 mandates that where execution is sought (a) more than two years after the decree or (b) against the legal representative of judgment debtor or (c) against the assignee or receiver in insolvency, where party to the decree has been adjudged to be an insolvent, the executing court shall issue notice to the person against whom execution is sought, requiring him to show cause, why the decree should not be executed. The use of word 'shall' indicates that the executing court is under an obligation to issue notice to the person against whom a decree is sought to be executed in the circumstances enumerated therein. The mandate of Order 21 Rule 22 (1) stands on two independent and mutually reinforcing foundations (i) the statutory compulsion-the use of word 'shall' in the provision leaves no discretion to the executing court in the circumstances enumerated therein, (ii) it incorporates the principles of natural justice as the legal representative of the deceased cannot be proceeded unless he is given an opportunity to contest the execution. Thus, the requirement of notice under Order 21 Rule 22 (1) to the persons enumerated therein is not a mere procedural courtesy but is the very foundation of the jurisdiction when the execution is sought against the estate of the deceased judgment debtor.
Order 21 Rule 23 (2) provides that where any person offers any objection to the execution of the decree the court shall consider such objection and shall make such order as it thinks fit.